Abstract-In this paper, we consider the Gaussian diamondwiretap channel that consists of an orthogonal broadcast channel from a source to two relays and a Gaussian fast-fading multiple access-wiretap channel from the two relays to a legitimate destination and an eavesdropper. For the multiple access part, we consider both the case with full channel state information (CSI) and the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, at the relays and the legitimate destination. For both the cases, we establish the exact secure degrees of freedom and generalize the results for multiple relays.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A model of wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner [2] , where a source wishes to send its message to a legitimate destination while keeping it secret from an eavesdropper. Wyner established the secrecy capacity for the degraded case where the eavesdropper receives a physically degraded version of the channel output at the legitimate destination. Csiszár and Körner generalized his work to general, not necessarily degraded, discrete memoryless wiretap channel [3] . This line of work has been subsequently extended to various multi-user scenarios, see e.g., [4] - [16] , however, the characterization of the secrecy capacity remains a challenging open problem in general. In fact, even for the seemingly simple case of the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is only known for the degraded case [9] .
Recently, as an alternative but insightful measure, the secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) has been actively studied [17] - [20] S.-H. Lee and A. Khisti are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada (e-mail: sihyeon.lee@utoronto.ca; akhisti@comm.utoronto.ca). W. Zhao was at University of Toronto when this work was done. The material in this paper was presented in part at IEEE ISIT 2016 [1] . This work was supported by QNRF, a member of Qatar Foundation, under NPRP project 5-401-2-161.
for various multi-user wiretap networks. For the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, the sum secure d.o.f. was shown to be 2 3 for almost all channel gains [18] . For achievability, a cooperative jamming scheme was proposed that incorporates real interference alignment [21] at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper. In many practical scenarios, however, it is hard for the source and the legitimate destination to know the eavesdropper's channel state information (CSI). In [20] , the secure d.o.f. with no eavesdropper's CSI was characterized for some interesting one-hop wiretap channels. For the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, the sum secure d.o.f. was shown in [20] to reduce to 1 2 with no eavesdropper's CSIT, which is achieved by a blind cooperative jamming scheme. We note that the prior work has focused on one-hop wiretap networks, and to the best of our knowledge, there has been no prior work on the secure d.o.f. for multi-hop wiretap networks.
In this paper, we consider the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel illustrated in Fig. 1 that consists of an orthogonal broadcast channel from a source to two relays and a Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel from the two relays to a legitimate destination and an eavesdropper. We consider both the case where the relays and the legitimate destination know the legitimate CSI and the eavesdropper's CSI and the case where they know only the legitimate CSI, which we call the case with full CSI and the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively. As a pessimistic scenario, we assume that the source does not know any of the legitimate CSI and the eavesdropper's CSI and the eavesdropper knows both the CSI's. 1 The proposed setting is a two-hop communication network and involves several new elements not present in the single-hop networks studied previously. Our model introduces a new possibility of utilizing common message and/or common noise for the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel. This brings in an interesting tension in the use of the broadcast links regarding whether we send independent messages, common message, common noise, or a function of those across the broadcast part. At one extreme, when the capacities of the orthogonal links in the broadcast part are sufficiently small, the optimal strategy turns out to send independent partial message to each relay and incorporate jamming schemes [18] , [20] for the multiple access part. At the other extreme, when the broadcast part has sufficiently high capacity to transmit common message 1 The source may not know the legitimate CSI when it is apart from the legitimate destination. However, we note that both our converse and achievability results hold when the source knows the legitimate CSI. We also note that the secrecy under the assumption of global CSI at the eavesdropper guarantees secrecy when the eavesdropper has limited knowledge of CSI. Such an assumption of global CSI at the eavesdropper is widely used for wiretap fading channels, e.g., [20] , [22] . or common noise symbols to the relays, without incurring bottleneck, it follows that the secure d.o.f. equals 1 using the results [23] - [25] for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel. When the link capacities of the broadcast part are moderate, however, the optimal scheme is not immediate. Furthermore, due to the possibility of sending common information across the broadcast part, we cannot assume in proving converse that the channel inputs and outputs at the relays are independent, whereas channel inputs at transmitters are inherently independent in most one-hop wiretap networks.
In the absence of secrecy constraint, our model falls back to the diamond channel introduced by Schein [26] , whose capacity is not known in general. For a range of moderate link capacities at the broadcast part, [27] - [30] characterized the capacity of the diamond channel, which is strictly tighter than the cutset bound. For achievability, a coding scheme incorporating multicoding at the source was proposed in [27] , [28] . This scheme was generalized in [29] , [30] by considering common message sent to the relays. For converse, [28] , [29] used a technique from [31] to take into account the correlation between the two relay signals. The converse proof technique used in [28] , [29] was refined and tightened in [30] and was generalized in [32] for the scenario where there are two destinations. In the presence of a secrecy constraint, such converse proof techniques need to be adopted carefully by taking into account the stochastic encoding functions introduced to confuse the eavesdropper. Those works [27] , [28] were generalized in [33] for the degraded Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel, in which the secrecy capacity was characterized for several ranges of channel parameters. For non-degraded case, however, the coding scheme used in [33] achieves zero secure d.o.f. and structured codes such as interference alignment and beamforming schemes need to be involved to achieve a positive secure d.o.f.
For the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel in Fig. 1 , we establish the exact secure d.o.f. in terms of the link d.o.f.'s at the broadcast part, both for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI. In the converse proof for the case with full CSI, we assume a deterministic model as in [20, Section 4.2.1] and then apply similar steps to the secrecy penalty lemma [18, Lemma 1] . As a result, we encounter a term corresponding to the amount of independent randomness that is injected at each relay to confuse the eavesdropper. Such randomness cannot be too large due to the reliability constraint at the legitimate receiver. To capture the trade-off between the message rate and the amount of such randomness, we adapt the proof steps of the role of a helper lemma [18, Lemma 2] for our model. For the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, we use one more known result from [20] , [34] that the entropy of the channel output sequence at a receiver whose CSI is not available at the transmitters is at least as large as that at a receiver whose CSI is available.
Our achievability part is based on five key constituent schemes. In particular, we propose two new schemes that utilize common noise, in a way that the common noise signals are beam-formed in the null space of the legitimate destination's channel. One of these two schemes is for the case with full CSI and is called a simultaneous alignment and beamforming (S-AB) scheme, which incorporates alignment of the message and the common noise signals at the eavesdropper. The proposed S-AB scheme also extends easily to the case with more than two relays and yields the best achievable secure d.o.f. The other scheme is for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI and is called a computation for jamming (CoJ) scheme, which efficiently utilizes the broadcast links by incorporating computation between the message and the common noise symbols at the source. The remaining three schemes are straightforward extensions of the previously known schemes, i.e., the cooperative jamming scheme [18] and blind cooperative jamming scheme [20] for the Gaussian multiple accesswiretap channel and the message-beamforming scheme [23] , [24] for the Gaussian MISO wiretap channel.
As a natural extension, we also consider a generalized Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel with more than two relays. The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally present the model of the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel. Our main results on the secure d.o.f. are given in Section III. In Sections IV and V, we prove the converse and the achievability parts, respectively. We extend the results for the case with multiple relays in Section VI. We conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel illustrated in Fig. 1 that consists of a broadcast channel from a source to two relays and a Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel from the two relays to a legitimate destination and an eavesdropper. For the broadcast part, the source is connected to the two relays through orthogonal links of capacities C 1 and C 2 . For the multiple access part, the channel outputs Y 1 (t) and Y 2 (t) at time t at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, are given as
where X 1 (t) and X 2 (t) are the channel inputs from relays 1 and 2, respectively, h k (t) and g k (t) for k = 1, 2 are the channel fading coefficients to the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, and N 1 (t) and N 2 (t) are independent Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, at time t. The transmit power constraint at relay k = 1, 2 is given as
where n denotes the number of channel uses.
We assume a fast fading scenario where h 1 (t), h 2 (t), g 1 (t), and g 2 (t) are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion over time according to an arbitrary real-valued joint density function f (h 1 , h 2 , g 1 , g 2 ), whose all joint and conditional density functions are bounded and whose support set does not include zero and infinity, i.e., there exists a positive finite L such that
We note that (3) is a mild technical condition because by choosing L large enough, the omitted support set can be reduced to a negligible probability that has a vanishing impact on the degrees of freedom. For notational convenience, let
denote the legitimate channel state information (CSI) and the eavesdropper's CSI up to time t, respectively.
We assume that the source does not know any of the legitimate CSI and the eavesdropper's CSI and the eavesdropper knows both the CSI's. Two cases are considered regarding the availability of CSI at the relays and the legitimate destination. First, we consider a case where both the legitimate CSI and the eavesdropper's CSI are available at the two relays and the legitimate destination, which we call the case with full CSI. We also consider another case where only the legitimate CSI is available at the two relays and the legitimate destination, which we call a case with no eavesdropper's CSI. We note that our achievability and converse techniques for the case with full CSI and our achievability technique for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI can be adapted for the scenario with fixed channel gains over time and for the scenario with complex channel fading coefficients, as remarked at the end of Section III.
A (2 nR , n) secrecy code consists of a message W ∼ Unif[1 : 2 nR ], 2 a stochastic encoder at the source that (randomly) maps W ∈ [1 :
], a stochastic encoder at time t = 1, . . . , n at relay k = 1, 2 that (randomly) maps (J k , h t , g t ) and (J k , h t ) for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively, to X k (t) ∈ X k , and a decoding function at the legitimate destination that maps (Y
n ) for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively, toŴ ∈ [1 : 2 nR ]. The probability of error is given as P (n) e = P (Ŵ = W ). A secrecy rate of R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (2 nR , n) codes such that lim n→∞ P (n) e = 0 and 2 [i : j] for two integers i and j denotes the set {i, i+1, · · · , j} and Unif[S] for a set S denotes the uniform distribution over S.
The secrecy capacity is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates.
In this paper, we are interested in asymptotic behavior of the secrecy capacity when P tends to infinity. We say
is achievable when C 1 and C 2 satisfy
according to the context. Without loss of generality, let us assume C 1 ≥ C 2 , which implies α 1 ≥ α 2 .
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our main results of this paper. The following two theorems present the secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively, whose proofs are in Section IV for the converse parts and in Section V for the achievability parts. Theorem 1. The secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian diamondwiretap channel with full CSI at the relays and the legitimate destination is equal to
Theorem 2. The secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian diamondwiretap channel with no eavesdropper's CSI at the relays and the legitimate destination is equal to
We note that the secure d.o.f. of the classical Gaussian wiretap channel is zero. Theorems 1 and 2 show that the secure d.o.f. can be greatly improved by deploying relays. First, note that even if α 2 = 0, the secure d.o.f. of 1 2 is achievable as long as α 1 ≥ 1 2 , both for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI. This is because relay 2 can act as a helper [20] that enables to produce a jamming signal in cooperation with relay 1. We also note that when each of α 1 and α 2 is higher than or equal to 1, one secure d.o.f. is achievable for both the cases. For the case with full CSI, this is natural from the known results [23] , [24] for the Gaussian multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel, where the source has two antennas and each of the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper has one antenna. In this Gaussian MISO wiretap channel, one secure d.o.f. is achievable by beamforming the message signal in the null space of the eavesdropper's channel. Similarly, if the source can send the message with d.o.f. 1 to both the relays for our diamond-wiretap channel, the relays are able to beam-form the message signals in the null space of the eavesdropper's channel. However, with no eavesdropper's CSI, this is not immediate from the known results for the Gaussian MISO wiretap channel. The secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian MISO wiretap channel is still 1 with no eavesdropper's CSI [25] , but it is achieved by sending an artificial noise signal in the null space of the legitimate destination in addition to the message signal. To translate this scheme to our diamond-wiretap channel, the source needs to send to the relays common artificial noise as well as (partial) messages, which requires α 1 ≥ 1, α 2 ≥ 1, and α 1 + α 2 ≥ 3. To achieve (α 1 , α 2 , d s ) = (1, 1, 1), we propose a novel scheme that incorporates computation of the message and artificial noise symbols at the source. This scheme involves transmitting a judicious function of the message and noise symbols from the source such that we only require (α 1 , α 2 ) = (1, 1), yet accomplish noise-beamforming as discussed above.
For the special case of symmetric link capacities, i.e., α 1 = α 2 = α, the secure d.o.f.'s are given as
for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively. Note that the secure d.o.f. is 2α up to α = for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively. In this range, the broadcast part is the bottleneck and hence it is optimal to send independent partial messages to the relays and to incorporate the cooperative jamming [18] and the blind cooperative jamming [20] for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively. After this threshold value of α, the source needs to send some common information (same message or common artificial noise) to achieve a higher secure d.o.f. and this causes the reduction of the gain in secure d.o.f. with respect to α. In Section VI, we investigate the effect of the absence of the eavesdropper's CSI on the secure d.o.f. for a generalized model with multiple relays.
Remark 1.
For the scenario where the channel fading coefficients are fixed during the whole communication, the lower and upper bounds on the secure d.o.f. for the case with full CSI in Theorem 1 and the lower bound on the secure d.o.f. for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI in Theorem 2 continue to hold for almost all channel gains. For an upper bound with no eavesdropper's CSI, a key result from [34] used for the upper bound in Theorem 2, i.e., the entropy of the channel output at the eavesdropper is at least as large as that at the legitimate destination, does not seem to be immediately generalized to the scenario with fixed channel gains.
Remark 2. We note that our achievability results can be generalized for complex channel fading coefficients by applying [35, Lemma 7] in our analysis of interference alignment. Also, our converse result for the case with full CSI can be generalized for complex channel fading coefficients in a straightforward manner.
IV. CONVERSE
For the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, it is shown in [20, Section 4.2.1] that there is no loss of secure d.o.f. if we consider the following deterministic model with integer-input and integer-output, instead of the model (1)- (2) in Section II:
with the constraint
where · denotes the floor function. Likewise, it can be shown that there is no loss of secure d.o.f. in considering the deterministic model (6) and (7) for the multiple access part in our Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel. 4 Hence, in this section, let us assume that the multiple access part is given as (6) and (7) . In this section, c i 's for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . are used to denote positive constants that do not depend on n and P . We note that h n , g n are known to the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper for the case with full CSI. For the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, we assume g n in addition to h n is available at the legitimate destination, which only possibly increases the secure d.o.f. Hence, h n , g n are conditioned in every entropy and mutual information terms in this section, but are omitted for notational convenience.
A. Proof for the converse part of Theorem 1
From the cut-set bound, we can easily obtain
Hence, it remains to show d s ≤ 
where (a) is from the Fano's inequality, (b) is from the secrecy constraint, and (c) is because a deterministic model in (6) is assumed in this section. To bound H(Y n 2 ) in (9), it follows that
where (a) is from [20, Lemma 2].
5
Now continuing (9) with (10) substituted, we have
Note that the term H(X n 2 |J 2 ) signifies the amount of independent randomness injected at relay 2 to confuse the eavesdropper. Such randomness cannot be too large because of the reliability constraint at the receiver. To capture the tradeoff between the rate R and H(X n 2 |J 2 ), we apply similar steps to the role of a helper lemma [18, Lemma 2] . We start from the Fano's inequality to get
For the term H(Y n 1 |J 1 , J 2 ), we have
where (a) is from Lemma 2 in [20] and (b) is due to the Markov chain X n 2 − J 2 − (X n 1 , J 1 ). Therefore, by substituting (13) in (12), we obtain
5 We note that the constraint in [20, Lemma 2] is satisfied under our channel model.
Combining (11) and (14), we have
and, in turn,
Combining with (8), we finish the proof for the converse part of Theorem 1.
B. Proof for the converse part of Theorem 2
Note that (9) continue to hold for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI. Continuing with (9) , it follows that
By applying similar steps as those to derive (14), we can obtain
Continuing with (15) substituted by (16) for k = 1, 2, we have can not be larger than n · o(log P ).
6 Therefore, we have
Since the bound on d s for the case with full CSI continues to hold for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, we finish the proof for the converse part of Theorem 2.
V. ACHIEVABILITY
The direct parts of Theorems 1 and 2 are proved by first identifying a few key constituent schemes and then timesharing among them appropriately. Let us first provide a highlevel description of those schemes and then give a detailed one. First, the following three schemes require the eavesdropper's CSI at the relays and the legitimate destination and their operations are illustrated in Fig. 2. • [Scheme 1 achieving (α 1 , α 2 , d s ) = ( . The source sends a 6 The channel assumption in [34] is satisfied under our channel model. partial message to each relay in a way that each relay has a different partial message, which requires α 1 = α 2 = 1 3 . Then, the relays operate according to the cooperative jamming scheme [18] for the Gaussian multiple accesswiretap channel, which is briefly explained in the following. Each relay sends independent partial message (d.o.f. 3 ) in a way that the noise signals are aligned at the legitimate destination and a partial message signal sent from a relay is aligned with and is perfectly masked by the noise signal sent from the other relay at the eavesdropper.
• [Scheme 2 achieving (α 1 , α 2 , d s ) = (1, 1, 1) . Incorporation of message-beamforming [23] , [24] ]:
The source sends the message with d.o.f. 1 to both the relays, which requires α 1 = α 2 = 1. Both the relays send the message cooperatively in a way that the message signals are beam-formed in the null space of the eavesdropper's channel. Next, the following two schemes operate with no eavesdropper's CSI at the relays and the legitimate destination, which are illustrated in Fig. 3 .
• [Scheme 4 achieving (α 1 , α 2 , d s ) = ( . Then, the relays operate according to the blind cooperative jamming scheme [20] for the wiretap channel with helpers. Relay 1 sends the message (d.o.f. the entire space at the eavesdropper, the message can be shown to be secure. To show the achievability part of Theorem 1, we perform time-sharing among Scheme 1, Scheme 4, and any of Schemes 2, 3, and 5. For the achievability part of Theorem 2, we timeshare between Schemes 4 and 5. Because Schemes 1, 2, and 4 are straightforward extensions of the previously proposed schemes in [18] , [20] , [23] , [24] , we give a detailed description only for Schemes 3 and 5. To that end, we first present some achievability results for the Gaussian multiple accesswiretap channel, which corresponds to the multiple access part of our model where each relay acts as a source having its own message. In particular, to take into account the possible transmission of common noise from the source to the relays in our model, we assume that a common noise sequence is available at the sources of the Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel. In such a Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, source k = 1, 2 wishes to send message W k of rate R k to the legitimate destination while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper. A secrecy rate tuple (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of codes with block length n such that lim n→∞ P (Ŵ 1 = W 1 orŴ 2 = W 2 ) = 0 and lim n→∞
The following two theorems give achievable secrecy rate regions for the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel for the case with full CSI at the sources and the legitimate destination and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI at the sources and the legitimate destination, respectively. Since these theorems are direct consequences of the achievablility result in [10], their proofs are omitted in this paper.
Theorem 3. For the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel with full CSI at the sources and the legitimate destination and with common i.i.d. noise U ∼ p(u) available at the sources, a secrecy rate tuple 
Remark 3. Theorems 3 and 4 can be obtained from [10] by applying the technique of adding prefix channels introduced in [3] . We add prefix channel p(u,
) for the case with full CSI and add prefix channel p(u, x k |v k , h) = p(u)p(x k |u, v k , h) for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI. Now, let us describe Schemes 3 and 5. Scheme 3 achieving (α 1 , α 2 , d s ) = (1, 1, 1) . Simultaneous alignment and beamforming scheme: The message W of rate R is split into W 1 and W 2 each of which having rate R/2. Then, the source sends W k to relay k together with a common noise sequence U n generated in an i.i.d. manner according to Unif[C(a, Q)], where
for some positive real number a and positive integer Q which will be specified later. This transmission from the source to 7 In Theorems 3 and 4, h = (h 1 , h 2 ) and g = (g 1 , g 2 ) denote the random channel fading coefficients generated by f (h 1 , h 2 , g 1 , g 2 ) .
the relays imposes the following constraints:
Now, we apply Theorem 3 for the multiple access part with the following choices of R 1 , R 2 , and p (v 1 )p(v 2 )p(x 1 |u, v 1 , h, g)p(x 2 |u, v 2 , h, g ):
Then, the channel outputs at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper are given as
respectively. According to Theorem 3, the secrecy rate of R is achievable if
are satisfied. Let us bound the first term in the RHS of (19) . The constellation at the legitimate destination consists of (2Q+1) 2 points and the minimum distance d min of which can be bounded using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation [21] as follows: for any δ > 0, there exists a constant k δ such that
for almost all channel fading coefficients except a set of Lebesque measure zero. Since the probability that a realization of channel fading coefficients does not satisfy (22) is negligible, for the sake of brevity, let us assume that channel fading coefficients satisfy (22) in the subsequent analysis. Let (V 1 ,V 2 ) denote the estimate of (V 1 , V 2 ) which is chosen as the closest point to Y 1 in the constellation. Then, we have
By choosing Q = P for some γ > 0, we have
To meet the power constraints, we choose γ as follows:
According to the Fano's inequality, it follows that
Therefore, the first term in the RHS of (19) can be bounded as
For the second term in the RHS of (19) , it follows that
where (a) is due to the Markov chain
Next, for the first term in the RHS of (20), we have
= log(2Q + 1) − 1 2 log 2πe
for
, where (a) is because P (h eff = 0) = 0 for our channel model and for given Y 1 , h, g with h eff = 0, V and N 1 have a one-to-one relationship. For the second term in the RHS of (20), we have
where (a) is from (24) . Similarly, for the terms in the RHS of (21), we can show
By substituting (19)- (21) with (23)- (28) and then choosing δ sufficiently small, we have
for the multiple access part. From (17), (18), and (29), we conclude that 1, 1) . Computation for jamming scheme: In this scheme, we wish to apply Theorem 4 for the multiple access part with the following choices of R 1 , R 2 , and
where
Note that the power constraints at the relays are satisfied since
, |h 2 | . To that end, one naive approach is to let the source send the message W to relay 1 and send a common noise sequence U n to both relays 1 and 2, which requires
However, there is a cleverer way to enable the aforementioned relay operations, in which the source computes V n 1 (W ) + U n and sends the sum to relay 1. To relay 2, the source sends U n . This transmission from the source to the relays is possible if the following constraints are satisfied:
Now, the channel outputs at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper are given as
respectively. According to Theorem 4, the following secrecy rate can be achieved.
Let us bound the first term in the RHS of (32) . We have
For the second term in the RHS of (32), it follows that
where (a) is by applying similar steps as those used for obtaining (25) and (b) is because all channel fading coefficients are assumed to be bounded away from zero and infinity. By substituting (32) with (33) and (34) and by choosing δ sufficiently small, we have
for the multiple access part. From (30) , (31) , and (35), we conclude that (α 1 , α 2 , d s ) = (1, 1, 1) is achievable. Now, we are ready to prove the achievability parts of Theorems 1 and 2.
A. Proof for the achievability part of Theorem 1
Note that α 1 ≥ α 2 without loss of generality in our model. First, consider the case where the minimum of (4) is equal to α 1 + α 2 , which implies 2α 1 + α 2 ≤ 1. We use timesharing technique as follows: use Scheme 1 for 3α 2 fraction of time, use Scheme 4 for 2(α 1 − α 2 ) fraction of time, and keep silent for the remaining fraction. 8 Then, it can be easily shown d s = α 1 + α 2 is achievable. Next, consider the case where the minimum of (4) is given as
, by using Scheme 1 for 3α 2 fraction of time and using Scheme 4 for 1 − 3α 2 fraction of time, (1 + α 2 ) is achievable. Finally, consider the case where the minimum of (4) is 1, which implies α 1 ≥ 1 and α 2 ≥ 1. By using any of Schemes 2, 3, and 5, d s = 1 is trivially achievable.
B. Proof for the achievability part of Theorem 2
We note that a variant of Scheme 4 where the roles of relays 1 and 2 are swapped can achieve (α 1 , α 2 , d s ) = (0,
2 ), and let us call this scheme as Scheme 4 * . First, consider the case where the minimum of (5) is equal to α 1 + α 2 , which implies 8 Note that 3α 2 + 2(α 1 − α 2 ) = 2α 1 + α 2 ≤ 1. 2α 1 + 2α 2 ≤ 1. By using Scheme 4 for 2α 1 fraction of time and Scheme 4 * for 2α 2 fraction of time and keeping silent for the remaining fraction, d s = α 1 + α 2 can be shown to be achievable. Next, consider the case where the minimum of (5) is given as 1 + α 2 ) . Finally, consider the case where the minimum of (5) is 1, which implies α 1 ≥ 1 and α 2 ≥ 1. By using Scheme 5, d s = 1 is trivially achievable.
VI. GENERALIZATION TO M RELAYS
In this section, we consider a generalized Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel where there are arbitrary number of relays. Assume that there are M ≥ 2 relays with transmit power constraint of P . For the broadcast part, the source is connected to M relays through orthogonal links, where the link capacity to relay k = 1, . . . , M is C k such that lim P →∞ C k 1 2 log P = α k . For the multiple access part, the channel outputs Y 1 (t) and Y 2 (t) at time t at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, are given as
in which X k (t) is the channel input at relay k, h k (t)'s and g k (t)'s are channel fading coefficients to the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, and N 1 (t) and N 2 (t) are independent Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, at time t. Similarly as in Section II, we assume fast fading 9 , no CSI at the source, and full CSI at the eavesdropper, and consider the two cases regarding the availability of CSI at the relays and the legitimate destination, i.e., the case with full CSI and the case with no eavesdropper's CSI. A secrecy code, secrecy capacity, and secure d.o.f. are defined by a straightforward generalization from Section II. For the brevity of the results, we focus on the symmetric case with C 1 = · · · = C M = C, which implies α 1 = · · · = α M = α.
The following two theorems present our results on the secure d.o.f. for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively. can not be larger than n · o(log P ) for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI from [34, Section 6] . 10 In terms of d.o.f., equivalently, we have
and the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, at the relays and the legitimate destination. Our results show that the absence of the eavesdropper's CSI reduces the secure d.o.f. for some range of moderate link d.o.f.'s of the broadcast part, but its effect decreases as the number of relays increases. For the converse part, we introduced a technique of capturing the trade-off between the message rate and the amount of independent randomness injected at each relay. For the achievability part, we newly proposed a simultaneous alignment and beamforming (S-AB) scheme and a computation for jamming (CoJ) scheme for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper's CSI, respectively. Both the schemes incorporate transmitting common noise from the source to the relays and beamforming of common noise signals in the null space of the legitimate destination's channel. The S-AB scheme involves aligning the message and the common noise signals at the eavesdropper simultaneously with the beamforming of the common noise signals. By doing so, it utilizes common information more efficiently than the message-beamforming scheme for more than two relays. The CoJ scheme involves computation between the message and the common noise symbols at the source, which requires less link d.o.f.'s at the broadcast part than naively sending the message and the common noise separately. We note that our proposed schemes utilize the common information sent from the source to the two relays. If the relays are allowed to conference, such common information can be shared at the relays by conferencing among them. In the recent work [36] , the exact secure d.o.f. was established for such a conferencing scenario for the case with full CSI. For achievability, a modified S-AB scheme was proposed where the relays share the common noise via conferencing (instead of the transmission from the source) and hence less link d.o.f.'s are required. As a final remark, we note that our CoJ scheme can be useful in keeping the message secret from the relays. Exploiting such a feature can be an interesting further work for the scenario where the source has common and confidential messages to each of the relays and the legitimate destination.
